(Continued from above)--Wilkerson discussed a variety of topics of interest to the students, not the least of these were the developments that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a U.S. led coalition. 

Wilkerson described two models of strategic decision making regarding national security affairs.  The first was that of the administration of President George H. W. Bush, in which issues and recommendations were coordinated by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. In this model, which Wilkerson saw first-hand as he was chief aide to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell, strong cabinet secretaries (State’s James A. Baker, Defense’s Dick Cheney, Treasury’s Nicholas F. Brady, etc.) may have differed, but knew the President’ decision would reflect a fair hearing of their views.  Trust (if not unanimity was enhanced, and the product (national security policy) was both of high quality and well implemented.

The second model is that of the administration of George W. Bush, in which Wilkerson was a part as chief of staff to Secretary of State Powell    Wilkerson commented that the George W. Bush national security council process was frequently undermined by Vice President Dick Cheney (and his ally, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld) who frequently tipped the balance of views reaching the president, or moved to reshape or ignore policy decisions in the implementation stage.  “More often than not, the last one to talk with the president on an issue, is the vice-president—alone.” Wilkerson said. "In my view, that access more often than not influenced the critical national security decisions."

Wilkerson cited not only a breakdown of intelligence, but the agenda of some senior policy makers and opinion-leaders to cherry-pick intelligence as key factors leading to the War in Iraq.  Wilkerson described a coalition of interests that led the U.S. to organize the 2003 invasion of Iraq.   He watched Dick Cheney operate when he was Secretary of Defense when Wilkerson served during the first Gulf War as a special assistant to General Powell who was then serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .  Wilkerson called Mr. Cheney, “the best secretary of defense since James V. Forrestal. "  But Wikerson is no fan of Mr. Cheney’s performance as Vice President.  Wilkerson views Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld as “ultra-nationists” who forged an alliance of opportunity with the “neo-conservatives,” but who do not share their views widely.  Nevertheless, Wilkerson believes, the events of September 11, 2001 gave both groups the circumstances to pursue an objective they shared, which began with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Wilkerson recalled how as a presidential candidate in 1952, Dwight Eisenhower, on campaign in Wisconsin, declined to defend his long-time patron, the highly regarded General George C. Marshall (who had served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense for President Harry Truman) from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s (whose home state was Wisconsin) charges that Marshall was responsible for losing China to the Communists.  “Marshall had been Eisenhower’s patron, taking Eisenhower from Lt. Colonel to Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.  It just goes to show how powerful are the politics of fear that Eisenhower would be silent in the face of McCarthy’s attack.”   Wilkerson sees this risk as ever-present and believes that it reoccurred after the tragic events of 9/11, when the Bush Administration exploited such fear to further its own ends, including invading Iraq.  “We must constantly guard against the politics of fear,” he said.

Wilkerson took questions from Club members on topics as wide ranging as dealing with the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy to the future of Taiwan, to the role of the National Economic Council.  He recounted dealing with the Chinese in the aftermath of the “spy plane collision” in April, 2001.  Meeting with Chinese officials in 2001 (coincidentally in the same hotel we were assembled, the Charles in Cambridge,) Wilkerson realized that, “the Chinese understood that they had a lot to learn about crisis management and were willing to ask questions and to learn from our experience.”

Looking ahead, Wilkerson expressed concern for the growing percentage of the U.S. federal deficit created by unfunded entitlements, as well as the growing federal debt and debt service requirements.  He is also concerned with the loss of America’s status as a manufacturer and net-exporter, in becoming a service driven, consumption driven economy.  “In the long term, in a contest between producing nation and consuming nation, I’ll bet on the producing nation to win,” he said.  He also said that “over-extension is a common denominator explaining why great empires throughout history have fallen, and I’m concerned that the United States, while not an empire in the traditional sense, is terribly over-extended, particularly with this war."

Jet Hollander, President of Pre-Eminence Strategy Group, sponsor of the event, and HBS Century Club Alumni President, praised Wilkerson as a courageous advocate of informed, balanced, long-range security policy formulation.  “You can’t listen to the colonel discuss any topic of significance to our nation, and not be amazed by the breadth of his strategic thinking and depth of experience.  He is a true patriot who has had an extraordinary career in military and foreign affairs and implicitly understands both the political players and the bureaucracy,” Hollander said.